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We study a large economy model in which individuals have private information about their 
productive abilities and their preferences. Moreover, there is aggregate uncertainty so that the 
social benefits from taxation and public goods provision are a priori unknown. The analysis is 
based on a mechanism design approach that imposes a requirement of robustness with respect 
to individual beliefs and a requirement of coalition-proofness. The paper provides a tractable 
and intuitive characterization of incentive-feasible tax and expenditure policies: Incentive 
constraints associated with productive abilities reflect only individual behavior, whereas those 
associated with public goods preferences reflect only collective behavior. 
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This paper provides a characterization of tax and expenditure policies that can be implemented
in a model in which tax revenues are used to cover the cost of public goods provision and in
which individuals have private information about their preferences for public goods and about
their productive abilities. It combines two di®erent strands of the literature in public economics
that have traditionally been separated: the theory of optimal income taxation in the tradition
of Mirrlees (1971), and the theory of public goods provision under asymmetric information.
The theory of optimal income taxation is concerned with the characterization of a welfare-
maximizing tax system under the assumption that individual labor supply is not exogenous
but a function of the tax system itself. This literature mostly ignores public expenditures and
assumes that the government has an exogenously given revenue requirement.1
The literature on public goods provision focusses on the characterization of a surplus-
maximizing rule for the provision and ¯nancing of public goods under the assumption that
individuals have private information on their preferences.2 This literature, however, disregards
the production side of the economy and the tax system as an alternative source of public goods
¯nance.
A joint treatment of optimal taxation and preference revelation is di±cult for two reasons.
First, the combination of private information about productive abilities and of private informa-
tion about public goods preferences gives rise to a multi-dimensional mechanism design problem.3
Second, the models that are used in the theory of optimal taxation and the theory of public
goods provision under asymmetric information are very di®erent. While the former studies a
large economy model in which each individual acts as a \price-taker" in the sense that the own
behavior neither a®ects aggregate tax revenue nor public spending, the latter studies a ¯nite
economy in which each individual has a direct impact on the supply of public goods.
The contribution of this paper is to link these two di®erent strands of the literatures. It
is based on a large economy model with endogenous production, as is the theory of optimal
taxation. The analysis of admissible tax and expenditure policies is complicated by the fact
that there is aggregate uncertainty, i.e., the cross-sectional distribution of productive abilities
and public goods preferences is taken to be random quantity. In particular, this implies that
the social bene¯t from public goods provision is a priori unknown.
However, this problem of information aggregation may be considered trivial. In a large
economy, a single individual's valuation has no in°uence on the social bene¯t from public goods
provision, so that a single individual's communication of public goods preferences and abilities
does not a®ect the supply of public goods. But if no individual can in°uence public goods
1The papers that include public goods assume that the social bene¯t from public goods provision is common
knowledge, so that the problem of preference elicitation is moot; see, Boadway and Keen (1993), Gahvari (2006),
Kaplow (2006) or Hellwig (2004).
2Early contributions ask whether e±ciency is possible given private information on preferences, see Clarke
(1971), Groves (1973) or d'Aspremont and G¶ erard-Varet (1979). The more recent literature includes participation
constraints, e.g., Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), Hellwig (2003) or Neeman (2004).
3The literature also refers to such problems as multi-dimensional screening problems; see Rochet and Chon¶ e
(1998) and Armstrong and Rochet (1999) for a theoretical treatment and Cremer et al. (2001) and Beaudry et al.
(2009) for applications to the theory of optimal taxation.
1provision anyway, then individuals may as well the truth. According to this view, to determine
the social bene¯ts from public goods provision is not a problem.
With an appeal to real-world political decision making, this conclusion seems to be overly
optimistic. If one thinks about the role of political parties and special interest groups, the as-
sumption that individuals with common interests may try to induce policies that are favorable
to them seems more plausible than the alternative view that the problem of preference revelation
is trivial provided that the number of individuals is su±ciently large. To articulate this concern
in a model of optimal income taxation, this paper relies on a notion of coalition-proofness, which
is based on the assumption that like-minded individuals can coordinate their communication of
public goods preferences. If a su±ciently large number of individuals departs from truth-telling,
the policy maker will end up with a wrong perception of the social bene¯ts from public goods
provision and the supply of public goods will be manipulated. A coalition-proof equilibrium
requires that there is no group of individuals who can bene¯t from such a joint lie about their
public goods preferences.
The main result of the paper is a tractable characterization of tax and expenditure policies that
are implementable as a coalition-proof equilibrium, and, moreover, satisfy a robustness require-
ment with respect to the speci¯cation of individual beliefs (see Ledyard (1978) and Bergemann
and Morris (2005)). The combination of coalition-proofness and robustness yields the following
result: an implementable tax and expenditure policy must satisfy individual and collective in-
centive compatibility constraints. The individual incentive constraints ensure that individuals
reveal their productive abilities. The collective incentive constraints ensure that individuals do
not lie about their public goods preferences. These are one-dimensional incentive constraints in
the following sense: For the characterization of individual incentive compatibility we may, with-
out loss of generality, assume that individuals reveal their preferences. For collective incentive
compatibility, we may assume that individuals reveal their productive abilities.
This decomposition into two sets of one-dimensional incentive constraints makes the mecha-
nism design problem tractable. We illustrate this by means of a simple model of optimal income
taxation and public goods provision, in which we characterize the optimal policy mechanism
that satis¯es both types of incentive constraints.
In addition, the paper shows that the relevance of the literature on the elicitation of public
goods preferences is not limited to ¯nite economy models in which each individual has a signif-
icant impact on the supply of public goods. Similar insights apply to large economy models in
which individuals with aligned interests may jointly try to manipulate policy outcomes.
This paper contributes to a recent literature in public economics which uses a mechanism design
approach in order characterize of optimal insurance contracts or tax systems.4 The work that
is most closely related to this paper is by Bassetto and Phelan (2008) and Kocherlakota and
Phelan (2009). While there are di®erences with respect to the main applications, there is a
shared methodological concern, namely how to deal with problems of equilibrium multiplicity
4See, for example, Golosov et al. (2003), Kocherlakota (2005), Acemoglu et al. (2008). Predecessors are
Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1995).
2in large economies with aggregate uncertainty.
A major di®erence, however, is the following: Bassetto and Phelan (2008) and Kocherlakota
and Phelan (2009) are concerned with equilibrium multiplicity per se, while this paper is con-
cerned with equilibrium multiplicity only to the extent that there is an alternative equilibrium
which is attractive for a subset of individuals who are able to coordinate their behavior in such a
way that the alternative equilibrium indeed becomes the more plausible outcome. The derivation
of collective incentive compatibility constraints is based on the requirement that such alternative
equilibria must not exist.
Moreover, the equilibrium multiplicity in Bassetto and Phelan (2008) is due to their focus
on direct mechanisms. As is well known in the mechanism design literature, and also shown by
Bassetto and Phelan (2008) for the setting of their paper, problems of equilibrium multiplicity
that occur with direct mechanisms can often be overcome by enriching the set of mechanisms,
i.e., by means of using non-direct mechanisms. For this reason, Kocherlakota and Phelan (2009)
do not limit themselves to direct mechanisms and study a problem of equilibrium multiplicity
that proves to be unavoidable even if more general mechanisms can be used.
In this paper, by contrast, equilibrium multiplicity can be addressed by restricting attention
to direct mechanisms. Combining the requirements of robustness and coalition-proofness makes
it possible to prove a revelation principle, so that it entails no loss of generality to look at tax
and expenditure policies that can be implemented by a truthful coalition-proof equilibrium of a
direct mechanism.
This result is important for the relevance of the individual and collective incentive com-
patibility constraints that are derived in this paper. They do not require speci¯c assumptions
about the \language" in which individuals communicate their characteristics to the mechanism
designer. They might as well vote over public goods, instead of reporting their public goods
preferences, and choose a utility-maximizing level of labor supply subject to an income tax
schedule, instead of reporting their ability level. In any case, the outcome has to be individually
and collectively incentive compatible.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 speci¯es the model and con-
tains a de¯nition of robustness. In Section 3, we introduce the notion of a robust coalition-proof
equilibrium and characterize implementable social choice functions. Section 4 studies implica-
tions of collective incentive compatibility requirements for more structured environments. The
last section contains concluding remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Environment
There is a continuum of individuals. Individual i's utility function is
U(q;c;y;wi;µi) = v(q;µi) + u(z;wi);
3where q is the amount of a public good, and z = (c;y) is a bundle specifying an individual's
private good consumption c and an individual's e®ective labor supply y.5 The function u is
increasing in c, decreasing in y and strictly quasiconcave. Moreover, it is assumed to be contin-
uous. The function v gives the utility due to public good provision. For a given µi, v is twice
continuously di®erentiable with vq > 0 and vqq · 0.
The taste parameter µi a®ects individual i's valuation of the public good. We assume that
there is a ¯nite ordered set of possible taste parameters £ = fµ1;:::;µmg and that the marginal
utility vq from public good provision is increasing in the taste parameter, vq(q;µl) < vq(q;µl+1).
Hence, individuals with a larger taste parameter bene¯t more from increased public good pro-
vision.
The skill or productivity parameter wi a®ects individual i's disutility of contributing to
the economy's output. There is a ¯nite ordered set of possible skill levels W = fw1;:::;wng.
Indi®erence curves in a y ¡ c-diagram satisfy the single crossing property, i.e., for any given y








Less productive individuals need to exert more e®ort to produce a given output and hence need
more compensation for an increased output requirement.
Individuals are privately informed about their taste parameter and about their skill level.
Moreover, at an aggregate level there is uncertainty about the cross-sectional distribution of
these characteristics in the economy. This distribution is taken to be the realization of a random
variable which takes values in a set S. A typical element s 2 S is referred to as a state. Formally,
s is a matrix that contains the population shares of individuals who have certain characteristics,
e.g.; skl is the population share of individuals with wi = wk and µi = µl.
The desirability of public good provision will typically depend on the state s. Consider two
states s and s0 such that, everything else being equal, in state s0 more individuals have a high
valuation of the public good than in state s. A welfare-maximizing policy will hence be such
that in state s0 more of the public good is provided than in state s.
A social choice function formalizes the dependence of outcomes on the state of the economy.
It consists of a public goods provision rule q : s 7! q(s) that speci¯es for each state s how much
of the public good is provided, and a private goods provision rule z : (s;w;µ) 7! z(s;w;µ), which
determines for each state, each skill level, and each taste parameter a consumption level and an
output requirement, i.e., z(s;w;µ) = (c(s;w;µ);y(s;w;µ)).





(y(s;wk;µl) ¡ c(s;wk;µl))skl ¸ r(q(s)) ; (1)
where r is an increasing and convex cost function which captures the resource requirement of
public good provision.
5The literature on the revelation of public goods preferences typically uses additively separable utility functions
so that the utility from private goods consumption is a linear function of a good called money. Our model only
assumes that the utility function is additively separable between the private goods c and y, on the one hand, and
the public good q, on the other.
4This speci¯cation restricts attention to social choice functions that are anonymous in the
following sense: for a given state s, two individuals who have the same taste parameter and
the same skill level receive the same private goods consumption and have to provide the same
output. Also, a permutation of individual characteristics which leaves the joint cross-section
distribution of public goods preferences and skill levels una®ected does neither a®ect the decision
on public goods provision nor, for given (w;µ), the corresponding consumption level and output
requirement.6
2.1 Robust Mechanism Design
We seek to characterize social choice functions that can be made the equilibrium allocation
of a game of incomplete information in which individuals have information about their own
characteristics but lack information about the characteristics of others and about the state s
of the economy. Moreover, in order to avoid speci¯c assumptions about individual beliefs, we
will use the notion of robust implementability that has been introduced by Ledyard (1978) and
Bergemann and Morris (2005).
An individual is henceforth characterized by a preference parameter, a productivity level,
beliefs about the distribution of these characteristics in the economy and beliefs about the beliefs
of other individuals. Following Bergemann and Morris (2005) we summarize these data in a type
space T := [T;¯;¼], where T is the set of \abstract" types, ¯ : T ! W £ £ is a mapping that
speci¯es the skill level and the preference parameter of an individual with type t. We also refer
to ¯(t) as the payo® type of type t. The function ¼ speci¯es the beliefs of an individual of type
t with respect to the cross-sectional distribution of types, i.e., ¼(X j t) is the probability that a
type t individual assigns to an event X ½ ¢(T).
In words, an individual's type ti is a random variable that takes values in the set of types
T. Consequently, the payo® type and the belief type of individual i are given by the random
variables ¯(ti) and ¼(¢ j ti), respectively. Also, the cross-sectional distribution of types Á is
a random variable that takes values in the set of probability measures over T, ¢(T). An
individual's beliefs are speci¯ed as a probability distribution over the possible realizations of Á.
In the following we treat the abstract set of types T and the function ¯ as given. Also we
assume that, for each element (w;µ) of W £ £, there exists a type such that ¯(t) = (w;µ). By
contrast, we will vary the function ¼ because we seek to understand how the outcomes that a
mechanism designer can achieve depend on assumptions about the beliefs of individuals.
We seek to implement a social choice function by means of an anonymous allocation mecha-
nism, i.e., a mechanism whose outcome is left una®ected by a permutation of individual actions.7
Formally, an anonymous allocation mechanism M = (A;Q;Z) speci¯es an action set A and a
collection of functions, where Q : ± 7! Q(±) gives the level of public good provision as a function
of the cross-sectional distribution of actions ±, and the function Z : (±;a) 7! Z(±;a) speci¯es a
consumption level C and an output requirement Y as a function of an individual's message a
and of the distribution of messages ±, Z(±;a) = (C(±;a);Y (±;a)).
6Guesnerie (1995) refers to these properties as recipient anonymity and anonymity in in°uence, respectively.
7For a more extensive discussion of anonymous games, see Kalai (2004).
5A (mixed) strategy in the game induced by M is a function ¾ : T ! ¢(A) that speci¯es
a probability distribution over actions for each type of individual. Put di®erently, the action
chosen by individual i is a random variable a(ti). The probability, conditional on the event
ti = t, that a(ti) takes values in subset A0 of A is in the following denoted by ¾(A0 j t).
We denote by ±(Á;¾) := Á±¾¡1 the cross-sectional distribution of actions that is induced by
¾ if the cross-section distribution of types is Á. We assume that a law of large numbers for large
economies holds so that we can interpret ¾(A0 j t) both as the probability that the action chosen
by a type t individual belongs to a subset A0 of A and as the fraction of type t individuals who
choose an action in A0.8 Consequently, for given Á, we can treat ±(Á;¾) as non-random.
Given that all other individuals follow a strategy ¾, the expected payo® of a type t individual






U(Q(±(Á;¾));Z(±(Á;¾);a);¯(t)) dÂ(a) d¼(Á j t) :
Given M and ¼, a strategy ¾¤ is said to be an interim Nash equilibrium, if for each t,
~ U(¾¤;¾¤(t);t) ¸ ~ U(¾¤;Â;t) ; (2)
for all Â 2 ¢(A).9
Given beliefs ¼, a social choice function (q;z) is said to be implementable if there is some
mechanism M such that, for every Á, the equilibrium allocation of the mechanism is equal to
the outcome that is stipulated by the social choice function for the corresponding marginal
distribution of payo® types, henceforth denoted by s(Á) := Á ± ¯¡1. Formally, for given ¼, the
mechanism M is said to implement the social choice function (q;z) , if ¾¤ is an in interim Nash
equilibrium, and moreover, for every Á,
Q(±(Á;¾¤)) = q(s(Á)) (3)
and, for each i,
Z(±(Á;¾¤);a(ti)) = z(s(Á);¯(ti)) (4)
with probability 1.
A social choice function is said to be robustly implementable if there is a mechanism M and
a strategy ¾¤ such that conditions (2), (3), and (4) hold for every ¼.
This notion of robust implementability has been introduced by Ledyard (1978). It di®ers
from the one used by Bergemann and Morris (2005), who allow the mechanism that implements
the social choice function to depend on the beliefs ¼, i.e., a social choice function is robustly
implementable in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005) if, for every ¼, there is a mechanism
8For a discussion of the law of large numbers in large economies, see Sun (2006), Al-Najjar (2004) or Judd
(1985a).
9The terminology \interim Nash equilibrium" has been introduced by Bergemann and Morris (2005). A Bayes-
Nash equilibrium is the special case that arises if individual beliefs ¼ are derived from a common prior over the
possible states of the economy.
6M(¼) such that conditions (2), (3), and (4) hold. With our notion of robustness, the mechanism
designer is not allowed to choose di®erent mechanisms for di®erent speci¯cation of beliefs.10
This di®erence can be illustrated if we focus on a special class of beliefs, namely those
that lead to what is known in the literature as a mechanism design problem under complete
information. For such problems it is assumed that individuals have complete information about
their respective characteristics and that the mechanism designer is the only uninformed party.11
Formally, we say that the function ¼ gives rise to a complete information environment, if there
exists a state s0 such that, for all t, ¼(fÁ j s(Á) = s0g j t) = 1. The mechanism designer,
by contrast, knows only that individuals know the cross-sectional distribution of payo® types.
However, he does not know which one it is. Put di®erently, all he knows is that the function
¼ belongs to the class ¦c of belief functions that generate a complete information environment.
Consequently, it is natural to de¯ne robust implementation under complete information as the
requirement that conditions (2), (3), and (4) hold for every ¼ 2 ¦c. In this environment, having
a di®erent mechanism for each ¼ 2 ¦c is not feasible, because the mechanism designer does not
know ¼.
We can now turn to a characterization of the social choice functions that are robustly im-
plementable.
Proposition 1 The following statements are equivalent.
(a) A social choice function (q;z) is robustly implementable.
(b) A social choice function (q;z) is robustly implementable under complete information.
(c) A social choice function (q;z) satis¯es the following individual incentive compatibility con-
straints: For every s 2 S and every (w;µ) 2 W £ £,
U(q(s);z(s;w;µ);w;µ) ¸ U(q(s);z(s; ^ w; ^ µ);w;µ); (5)
for every ( ^ w; ^ µ) 2 W £ £.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix. It adapts arguments by Ledyard (1978) and
Bergemann and Morris (2005) to the given large economy setup. The individual incentive
compatibility constraints can be interpreted as follows: Suppose that the mechanism under
consideration is a direct mechanism. Then, a truthful revelation of types must be an ex post
equilibrium; i.e., once the state of the economy has been revealed, no individual regrets having
reported his characteristics truthfully to the mechanism designer.
With the incentive constraints in (5), the problem of information aggregation { i.e., the
problem to deduce the state s of the economy from the distribution of announcements that
individuals make to the mechanism designer { is trivial. Given that the economy is large, a single
10With the solution concept of an interim Nash equilibrium, this distinction is not essential. Both versions of
robustness give rise to the same constraints on the set of social choice functions, see Proposition 1 below. However,
for the results in subsequent sections it makes a di®erence which notion of robustness is employed.
11See Moore (1992) for an overview.
7individual cannot in°uence the state of the economy as perceived by the mechanism designer.
As a consequence, there is no constraint that relates the outcomes prescribed for some state s
to those prescribed for some alternative state s0. This is a striking di®erence to the literature on
public goods provision in \small" economies in the tradition of Clarke (1971), Groves (1973) or
d'Aspremont and G¶ erard-Varet (1979). In these models, each individual announces his public
goods preferences and thereby also a®ects the cross-sectional distribution of announcements.
2.2 Optimal income taxation
Given Proposition 1, we focus in the following on individually incentive-compatible social choice
functions. Using that the utility function U is additively separable, the incentive compatibility
constraints in (5) can be equivalently written as follows: for every s 2 S and every (w;µ) 2
W £ £,
u(c(s;w;µ);y(s;w;µ);w) ¸ u(c(s; ^ w; ^ µ);y(s; ^ w; ^ µ);w); (6)
for all ( ^ w; ^ µ). The utility that individuals derive from public goods does not matter for incentive
compatibility because (i) the economy is large and individuals take s as given, and (ii) by the
separability assumption, an individuals marginal rate of substitution between consumption c
and output y does not depend on the supply of public goods. This also implies that di®erences
in public goods preferences cannot be used as a screening device. Formally, the inequalities in
(6) imply that, for every s, for every given w and every pair µ and µ0,
u(c(s;w;µ);y(s;w;µ);w) = u(c(s;w;µ0);y(s;w;µ0);w); (7)
so that two individuals who di®er only in their taste parameter, derive the same utility from
their respective (c;y) combination, in every state s.
Given condition (7), it is without loss of generality to assume that also c(s;w;µ) = c(s;w;µ0)
and y(s;w;µ) = y(s;w;µ0), for every s, w, and every pair (µ;µ0).12 In the following we may
hence drop the dependence of consumption levels and output requirements on taste parameters
and write simply c(s;w) and y(s;w), respectively.
With this notation, we can write the individual incentive compatibility constraints as follows:
for every s, every w, and every ^ w,
u(c(s;w);y(s;w);w) ¸ u(c(s; ^ w);y(s; ^ w);w): (8)
The economy's resource constraint in (1) can now be written as follows: For all s,
n X
k=1
fk(s) (y(s;wk) ¡ c(s;wk)) ¸ r(q(s)) ; (9)
where, for any k 2 f1;:::;ng, fk(s) :=
Pm
l=1 skl.
12Any welfare-maximizing social choice function is such that individual utility levels are generated at a minimal
resource cost. Hence it must be true that y(s;w;µ) ¡ c(s;w;µ) = y(s;w;µ
0) ¡ c(s;w;µ
0). This equality in
conjunction with the fact that indi®erence curves in a y ¡ c diagram are strictly increasing and strictly convex,
yields c(s;w;µ) = c(s;w;µ
0) and y(s;w;µ) = y(s;w;µ
0).
8The model derived so far is a straightforward extension of the model of optimal income
taxation by Mirrlees (1971).13 A di®erence is that the present model has, in addition, private
information on preferences and aggregate uncertainty so that the optimal policy depends on the
state s of the economy. However, this has no bearing on the set of optimal policies. While the
incentive compatibility constraints make it di±cult to identify an individual's productivity level,
information on individual preferences is irrelevant, and there is no constraint that complicates
the determination of the state of the economy. The set of incentive-feasible policies is therefore
equivalent to those in the theory of optimal income taxation.
3 Collective Incentive Compatibility
The characterization of individually incentive-compatible social choice functions in the preceding
section has led to the conclusion that, in a large economy, uncertainty about the cross-sectional
distribution of individual characteristics plays no role. For instance, if there is uncertainty about
the social bene¯ts from public good provision, this uncertainty can be easily resolved because,
in a large economy, no individual has a direct in°uence on the supply of public goods, and hence
no individual minds revealing his public goods preference.
This view is somewhat implausible. Every democratic society knows the constant struggle
of political parties and all sorts of special interest groups about the desirability of expenditure
policies. Hence, in a large economy, individuals undertake collective actions in order to in°uence
the provision of public goods. This suggests that, in addition to individual incentive compat-
ibility constraints which incorporate how individual behavior depends on policy choices, the
model should also include collective incentive compatibility constraints which take account of
the possibility that individuals may lie collectively about their preferences in order to induce
policies that are more favorable to them.
Our approach is as follows: A coalition is a subset of types who have an incentive to coor-
dinate the actions they choose. If they jointly deviate from the equilibrium strategy they may
a®ect the mechanism designer's perception of the state of the economy and induce outcomes that
are more favorable to them. In addition, we impose the requirement that individual behavior
under such a coordinated deviation is a best response to the behavior of all other individuals.
We say that a social choice function is collectively incentive-compatible if it can be implemented
by a mechanism that does not provoke such deviations.
Before we develop these concepts more generally, we ¯rst use a simple model of optimal
income taxation and public goods provision to illustrate that, if we take only individual incentive
compatibility constraints into account, there may indeed by scope for manipulative collective
actions.
13Contributions to the theory of optimal income taxation often use a primal approach which relies on a charac-
terization of social choice functions that can be achieved by means of an income tax system, see Stiglitz (1982),
Boadway and Keen (1993), Gahvari (2006), Hellwig (2007), or Bierbrauer (2009a). This yields implementability
conditions that, for a given s, coincide with the constraints in (9) and (8).
93.1 A simple model of optimal income taxation and public good provision
Suppose that there are two states of the economy, s1 and s2. In both states half of the population
is half-skilled and half of the population is low-skilled. Moreover, in both states, among the low-
skilled, ¯fty per cent have a high valuation of the public good. Among the high-skilled, however,
25 per cent have a high taste for the public good in state s1 and 75 per cent have a high taste
for the public good in state s2.
We assume that preferences take the following form,




where q 2 f0;1g is the provision level of an indivisible public good. Moreover, we restrict
attention to a±ne income tax schedules, that consist of a linear income tax rate ¿ and a lump
sum transfer ®.14
A mechanism speci¯es, for each state s 2 fs1;s2g, whether the public good is provided,
q(s), the income tax rate, ¿(s), and the lump sum transfer, ®(s). Given the tax rate ¿(s) and
the lumps sum transfer ®(s) individuals with skill level w choose c and y in order to maximize
ln(c)¡
y
w subject to the budget constraint c = (1¡¿(s))y+®(s). Consequently, for given s and
w, c(s;w) and y(s;w) are given by
fc(s;w);y(s;w)g = argmaxc;y ln(c) ¡
y
w
s.t. c = (1 ¡ ¿(s))y + ®(s) (10)
By a standard revealed preferences argument, the allocation that results from these utility
maximization problems is individually incentive-compatible; i.e., it satis¯es the inequalities in










¸ kq(s) + ®(s) ; (11)
where k is the per capita cost of public goods provision.


















subject to the feasibility constraint in (11) and the constraints in (10), which ensure that in-
dividual behavior is utility maximizing given ¿(s) and ®(s). It is a straightforward exercise to
verify that the solution is such that:
1. For any ¿(s) and ®(s), c(s;wk) = wk(1 ¡ ¿(s)) and y(s;wk) = wk ¡
®(s)
1¡¿(s).
2. The optimal tax rate ¿¤(s) and transfer ®¤(s) are such that
¿¤(s) = ¿¤ = 1 ¡ ( ¹ w¸)
¡1 and ®¤(s) = (1 ¡ ¿¤)( ¹ w¿¤ ¡ kq(s)) ;
14This is a simple version of the model of optimal linear income taxation that has been introduced by Sheshinski
(1972). The results below can also be obtained in a model with a more general information structure, a more
general speci¯cation of preferences and unrestricted non-linear income taxation, see Bierbrauer (2009b).
10where ¹ w := 1
2(w1 + w2) is the average skill level and ¸ := 1
2( 1
w1 + 1
w2) is the average
marginal disutility of an increased output requirement. Note that switching from q(s) = 0
to q(s) = 1 implies that the lump sum transfer goes down, whereas the tax rate ¿ remains
constant.
We assume in the following that public goods provision is desirable in state s2 where many indi-
viduals have a high valuation of the public good, but not in state s1 where only few individuals
have a high valuation of the public good.15 In the following, we argue that there may be an
incentive for the group of high-skilled individuals to lie about their public goods preferences.
High-skilled individuals bene¯t, ceteris paribus, more from public goods provision than low-
skilled individuals. The reason is that the high-skilled individuals do not su®er as much from the
cost of public goods provision. To see this formally, note that as we switch from non-provision to
provision of the public good, the individuals' consumption remains constant, whereas the term
y
wk increases by k
wk. Obviously, this expression is decreasing in the skill level. Consequently, it
may well be the case that that high-skilled individuals bene¯t from public goods provision even





Suppose that the mechanism designer uses a direct mechanism to learn what the state of the
economy is; i.e., each individual reports a taste parameter and a skill level to the mechanism
designer. If the inequality in (12) holds, then all high-skilled individuals are better o® if the
mechanism designer chooses policy under the assumption that many high-skilled individuals have
a high valuation of the public good. Moreover, high-skilled individuals can induce this outcome
if they behave as follows: they communicate their skill parameters truthfully but, irrespective
of their true taste parameter, declare a low taste parameter with probability 1
4 and a high
taste parameter with probability 3
4. This implies that the messages received by the mechanism
designer are as if the true state of the economy was s2.
3.2 Coalition-Proof Equilibrium and the Revelation Principle
We now de¯ne formally what it means that the game induced by a mechanism M = (A;Q;Z)
has a coalition-proof equilibrium for some given speci¯cation of beliefs ¼.16
Given M and ¼, a strategy ¾¤ is said to be a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium if it
is an interim Nash equilibrium and there exists no other interim Nash equilibrium ¾0 with the
following properties: There exists a subset of types R ½ T such that the following requirements
are ful¯lled:









16The de¯nition below is a somewhat simpli¯ed version of the notion of a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
that by Bernheim et al. (1986). In particular, we also take a non-cooperative approach to coalition formation
and require that the individual behavior that is prescribed by a deviation is individually a best response. For
reasons of tractability, however, we do not require that deviations are relevant only in so far as they do not
trigger deviations by subcoalitions, which themselves are a concern only if they do not provoke deviations by
subcoalitions of the initial subcoalition, etc.
11i) Given that all types in T nR play according to ¾¤, it is a best response for a type in R to
play according to ¾0. Formally, for all t 2 R, and all Â 2 ¢(A),
~ U((¾¤
TnR;¾0




TnR is the restriction of ¾¤ to types not in R, and ¾0
R is the restriction of ¾0 to
types in R.
ii) The outcome that is induced if all types in T n R play according to ¾¤, and all types in R
play according to ¾0, is preferred by all individuals with types in R; i.e, for all t 2 R,
~ U((¾¤
TnR;¾0
R);¾0(t);t) > ~ U(¾¤;¾¤(t);t) : (14)
iii) The outcome that is induced if all types play according to ¾0 is preferred by all individuals
with types in R. Formally, for all t 2 R,
~ U(¾0;¾0(t);t) > ~ U(¾¤;¾¤(t);t) : (15)
The underlying idea is that an equilibrium ¾¤ must not leave incentives for a subset of individuals
to coordinate their behavior in such a way that they induce an outcome that makes all of them
better o®. The above de¯nition is very demanding with respect to the consistency requirements
that such a deviation from an equilibrium strategy ¾¤ has to satisfy: The behavior that is
prescribed by the deviation must be a best response for the deviating types, both if all types
play according to ¾0 and also if only the types in R play according to ¾0. Also, in both cases, the
outcome that is induced by the deviation must be bene¯cial for types in R. Hence, individuals
with types in R are willing to behave according to ¾0 and are thereby made better o®, provided
that all types in R play according to ¾0. This does not depend on whether or not types in T nR
also switch to ¾0 or stay with the old equilibrium ¾¤. From the perspective of types in R, getting
a preferred outcome is therefore a pure coordination problem.
Given ¼, a social choice function (q;z) is said to be implementable as a coalition-proof
interim Nash equilibrium, if there is a mechanism M and a strategy ¾¤ such that (i) ¾¤ is a
coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium, and (ii) the equilibrium allocation coincides with the
prescription of the social choice function for every Á; i.e., conditions (3) and (4) are satis¯ed.
We say that a social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism M and
a strategy ¾¤ such that requirements (i) and (ii) are ful¯lled for every ¼.
Proposition 2 If a social choice function is robustly implementable as a coalition-proof interim
Nash equilibrium, then there is also a direct mechanism (i.e., a mechanism with A = T ) such
that truth-telling (i.e., the \honest" strategy h : T ! ¢(T) with h(ftg j t) = 1, for all t) robustly
implements (q;z) as a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium.
The Proposition establishes that the revelation principle holds. This result is of interest for the
following reason: It is known in the literature that that the objective to implement a social choice







































































Allocation for states in S00
function as the unique equilibrium of some mechanism typically requires the use of non-direct
mechanisms.17 Hence, according to this literature, if one worries about equilibrium multiplicity,
considering only direct mechanisms involves a loss of generality. Proposition 2, by contrast, says
that if, under a direct mechanism, there is an alternative equilibrium so that some individuals
have incentives to lie, then there is no mechanism at all that implements the given social choice
function in a coalition-proof way. The di®erence is due to the robustness requirement that is
imposed in this paper. We illustrate this by means of the following example. A formal proof of
the Proposition is in the Appendix.
Example. Suppose that there are no public goods. Moreover, there are only two possible
skill levels, W = fw1;w2g. Let S0 be the set of states in which the population share of the high-
skilled is larger or equal than 1
2, and let S00 be the set of states in which it is smaller than 1
2.
Suppose that we seek to implement a social choice function with the following properties: for all
states, there is a binding incentive compatibility constraint so that high-skilled individuals are
indi®erent between the bundles z(s;w1) = (c(s;w1);y(s;w1)) and z(s;w2) = (c(s;w2);y(s;w2)),
and there is redistribution from the high-skilled to the low-skilled, y(s;w2) ¡ c(s;w2) > 0 and
y(s;w1) ¡ c(s;w1) < 0.18 However, the level of redistribution varies across states; it is large for
all s 2 S0 and small for all s 2 S00. This is illustrated by Figure 1. In this Figure, I1 is the
relevant indi®erence curve of the low-skilled, and I2 is the one of the high-skilled individuals.
With a direct mechanism, this social choice function cannot be implemented in a coalition-
proof way. Since the states in S0 involve more redistribution than the states in S00, we have
that u(z(s0;w2);w2) < u(z(s00;w2);w2), for any pair of states s0 2 S0, and s00 2 S00. Hence, a
17For a recent application, see Bassetto and Phelan (2008). For a more general discussion, see Jackson (2001).
18As is well-known in the literature, an optimal utilitarian allocation typically has these properties, see, e.g.,
Hellwig (2007).
































































Few individuals choose a2
collective lie so that some of the high-skilled individuals declare a low-skill level, makes all high-
skilled individuals better o®. Moreover, for every s, the incentive constraint of the high-skilled
is binding, so that the high-skilled are giving a best response if they lie about their skill level.
In the following we will show that a mechanism designer who knows the function ¼ can
generally eliminate the scope for such a collective deviation. We will then argue that this is no
longer true if we insist on robustness.
For the sake of concreteness, suppose ¯rst that all high-skilled individuals belief that the
states in S0 and S00 are equally likely, and, in addition, that this is known by the mechanism
designer. He may then use a non-direct mechanism M = (A;Z), with A = fa1;a2;a3g which
works as follows: In any state, an individual who chooses action a1 receives the consumption-
income bundle dedicated to the low-skilled individuals; i.e., taking the action a1 is interpreted
as saying \I am a low-skilled individual". Likewise, an individual who chooses action a2 receives
the bundle intended for the high-skilled individuals. The action a3 gives a very unattractive
bundle if many individuals choose action a2. This is illustrated in the left part of Figure 2,
where ±0 indicates a distribution of actions so that more than half of the population chooses
a2. However, if only few individuals choose action a2, then action a3 is very attractive for the
high-skilled individuals. This is illustrated by the right part of Figure 2, where ±00 indicates a
distribution of actions so that less than half of the population chooses a2.
This non-direct mechanism implements the social choice function in a coalition-proof way,
because there is no longer an equilibrium in which high-skilled individuals communicate having
a low-skill level: If all high-skilled individuals anticipate that the number of individuals choosing
a2 is small, so that the payo®s associated with actions a1, a2, and a3 are as in the right part
of Figure 2, then they are individually better of by choosing action a3. By contrast, if many
individuals choose a2, then payo®s are as in the left part, and a2 is a best response for the
high-skilled individuals.
14This construction eliminates the equilibrium in which high-skilled individuals mimic low-
skilled individuals. Conditional on many high-skilled individuals choosing action a1 it is a best
response for a high-skilled individual to choose action a3. By contrast, the other equilibrium
in which all high-skilled individuals choose action a2 and thereby communicate their skill level
truthfully to the mechanism designer remains intact: If the situations in Figure 2 arise with equal
probability, then choosing a2 is a best response for the high-skilled because action a3 yields a
very bad outcome with probability 1
2. Consequently, the non-direct mechanism M = (A;Z)
implements the social choice function under consideration in a coalition-proof way.
However, the non-direct mechanism does no longer work if we insist on robustness. To see
this, suppose that all individuals beliefs that states in S00 occur with probability 1. Then, all
individuals belief that the payo®s associated with actions a1, a2, and a3 are as in the right part
of Figure 2. Consequently, all individuals with a high-skill level will choose action a3 instead of
action a2, so that the social choice function is no longer reached.
3.3 Partial Coalition-Proofness
We will show in the following that the requirement of coalition-proofness can be considerably
simpli¯ed. More speci¯cally, we show that it su±ces to address incentives for groups of individ-
uals to misrepresent their public goods preferences. There is no need to worry about groups of
individuals who might lie about their skill levels.
We need to introduce some notation and some de¯nitions. First consider the following
modi¯cation of the incentive compatibility constraints in (8): for every s, every w, and every ^ w,
u(z(s;w);w) ¸ u(z(s; ^ w);w) + ²; (16)
for some given ² > 0. These constraints require that, for every s, an individual with skill level
w prefers the \own" consumption-output bundle z(s;w) strictly over any alternative bundle
z(s; ^ w) where the parameter ² is the minimal intensity of this strict preference.
Also, for direct mechanisms, we de¯ne a partially coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium
as follows: There is no deviation from truth-telling, which satis¯es the consistency requirements
(13)-(15), so that the deviating individuals reveal their skills but lie about their taste parameters.
We refer to such a deviation henceforth as a partial lie. Formally, a partial lie is a function
lp : R ! ¢(T) which is such that, for every t 2 R, lp(ft0 j w(t0) = w(t)g j t) = 1. Also,
we denote by ^ Á(Á;lp) the announced distribution of types that is induced by lp if the true
distribution of types is Á and the types not in R follow the truthful strategy h.
Finally, we denote the set of social choice functions which satisfy the modi¯ed incentive
compatibility constraints in (16), the feasibility constraints in (1), and, moreover, are robustly
implementable as a partially coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium, by ­(²).
Proposition 3 Suppose that there is some ¹ ² > 0 so that the set
S
0·²·¹ ² ­(²) is compact. Then,
to every social choice function (q;z) that is robustly implementable as a partially coalition-proof
interim Nash equilibrium, there is a social choice function (q0;z0) that is robustly implementable
as a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium and is such that for every s and every (µ;w),
v(q(s);µ) + u(z(s;w);w) is arbitrarily close to v(q0(s);µ) + u(z0(s;w);w).
15Partial coalition-proofness is a weaker requirement than \full" coalition-proofness. The former
requirement excludes lies about taste parameters, whereas the latter requirement excludes lies
about taste parameters and skill levels. The Proposition says that, one may, nevertheless focus
on weaker requirement of partial coalition-proofness. The reason is as follows: the adapted incen-
tive constraints in (16) imply that a lie about skill levels is incompatible with individual behavior
being a best response. From an ex post perspective, individuals would always regret a lie about
their skill level. Hence, the constraints in (16) in conjunction with partial coalition-proofness
imply full coalition-proofness. Moreover, if we let ² become very small, we can approximate
any social choice function in ­(0). This shows that the set of social choice functions that are
partially coalition-proof and the set of social choice functions that are fully coalition proof are
\approximatively" equivalent. The following example shows why there is no \exact" equivalence.
The Example continued. We have shown that the social choice function that is illustrated in
Figure 1 cannot be implemented as a robust coalition-proof equilibrium because the high-skilled
have an incentive to lie. We will now argue that there is, however, a social choice function which
is arbitrarily close and does not face this problem.
Suppose that the social choice function in Figure 1 is modi¯ed as follows: In both graphs,
the bundle for high-skilled individuals is moved to a slightly higher indi®erence curve.19 This
implies that truth-telling is the unique best response of the high-skilled, for every state s. A
deviation that involves lies about skill levels is therefore no longer consistent with equilibrium
behavior.
The example illustrates the general insight in Proposition 3. Once we introduce a tiny
amount of slack into the incentive compatibility constraints, deviations that involve lies about
skill levels are no longer viable. The example also shows why the slack is needed. If incentive
compatibility constraints are binding, lies that involve skill levels are a concern.
3.4 The main result
We will turn to the main result of the paper, which establishes that the constraints on the
set of implementable social choice functions can be separated as follows: The requirement of
robust implementability as an interim Nash equilibrium yields individual incentive compatibil-
ity constraints. These constraints ensure that individuals communicate their skills truthfully
to the mechanism designer. The requirement of coalition-proofness yields collective incentive
compatibility constraints, which ensure that individuals reveal their public goods preferences.
In particular, there is no need to worry about individual incentives for a misrepresentation of
public goods preferences or collective incentives for a misrepresentation of skill levels. As we
will see in Section 3.5, this makes the multi-dimensional mechanism design problem tractable.
Proposition 4 An individually incentive compatible social choice function is robustly imple-
mentable as a partially coalition-proof equilibrium if and only if the following collective incentive-
19To preserve feasibility, we may simultaneously have to move the low-skilled individuals to a slightly lower
indi®erence curve.
16compatibility constraint holds for every ¼: There is no subset of types R ½ T with a partial lie
lp : R ! ¢(T) so that for all t 2 R,
Z
¢(T)




U(q(s(Á));z(s(Á);¯(t));¯(t))d¼(Á j t) :
The proof of the Proposition is straightforward. We have shown before that individual incentive
compatibility implies that individuals who di®er only in their public goods preferences must
receive the same bundle of private goods, see equation (7). Consequently, individuals are willing
to communicate any taste parameter to the mechanism, so that every partial lie leads to a new
equilibrium. This implies that partial coalition-proofness reduces to the requirement that there
is no subset of individuals who bene¯t from a partial lie.
Consequently, the requirement of coalition-proofness can be reduced to a simple set of in-
equality constraints: There must not exist a group of individuals who bene¯t from the change
of the allocation that is induced by a false communication of public goods preferences. This
simple characterization is available because, by Proposition 3, as far as coalition-proofness is
concerned, we may, without loss of generality, assume that productive abilities are communi-
cated truthfully. Put di®erently, the problem to determine the state s of the economy requires
appropriately calibrated incentives only in so far as there is uncertainty about the cross-sectional
distribution of public goods preferences.
Individual incentive compatibility, by contrast, deals with a pure screening problem; i.e.,
with the revelation of individuals' characteristics, once the state s of the economy has been
determined. As we have seen in Section 2, this requires appropriate incentives only for the
revelation of productive abilities but not for public goods preferences.
3.5 Optimal income taxation and public good provision subject to collective
incentive compatibility constraints
To illustrate the tractability of our framework, we will now revisit the model of optimal income
taxation and public good provision that was introduced in Section 3.1, and which gives rise to
the following collective incentive problem: High-skilled individuals exaggerate their public goods
preferences because the public good is crowding out redistribution, and high-skilled individuals
bene¯t from decreased redistribution even if they do not value the public good very much.
The role of the collective incentive constraints is to eliminate the incentives for such behavior.
In the present setting, these constraints take the following form,







The constraint says that high-skilled individuals with a low taste for the public good weakly
prefer the allocation for state s1 in which the public good is not provided over the allocation in
state s2 in which it is provided.
The following Proposition characterizes the social choice function that maximizes expected
utilitarian welfare (assuming for simplicity that the objective function gives equal weights to
17both states), EW = 1
2W(s1) + 1
2W(s2), subject to the feasibility constraints in (11), the imple-
mentability constraints in (10), and the collective incentive compatibility constraint in (17).
Proposition 5 Suppose the optimum has q(s1) = 0 and q(s2) = 1. Then ¿(s1) and ®(s1)
are lower and ¿(s2) and ®(s2) are higher as compared to the case without collective incentive
constraints.
A formal proof of the Proposition can be found in the Appendix. The intuitive explanation is
as follows: Collective incentive compatibility constraints are needed to ensure that the high-
skilled individuals do not have an incentive to exaggerate their public goods preferences. Put
di®erently, from the perspective of the high-skilled, the allocation involving public good provision
is too attractive relative the one involving non-provision. Collective incentive compatibility
therefore requires that the state with public good provision is made more attractive and the
state with non-provision is made less attractive. This is achieved via an adjustment of the level
of redistribution. Public good provision is accompanied by increased redistribution and higher
taxes and non-provision by less redistribution and lower taxes; that is, the collective incentive
compatibility constraints induce a complementarity between public good provision and the level
of redistribution.
4 Collective incentive compatibility under complete information
In this last section, we study the implications of the collective incentive compatibility constraints
for mechanism design problems under conditions of complete information. This assumption
facilitates a comparison to theliterature on public goods that uses models with ¯nitely many
individuals. This comparison will demonstrate that the relevance of this literature is not limited
to economies which are so small that each single individual has a noticeable impact on the supply
of public goods. The same ideas are applicable in a large economy in which individuals with
aligned interests can jointly manipulate policy outcomes.
We assume that there is a commonly known cross-sectional distribution of productive abili-
ties, i.e., the vector f = (f1;:::;fn) is treated as known. By Proposition 3 this is without loss
of generality. Aggregate uncertainty is therefore entirely due to the fact that the distribution
of public goods preferences among individuals with skill level wk, is, for each k 2 f1;:::;ng,
unknown. Formally, the list sk := (sk1;:::;skm) is an unknown quantity, which takes values
in a set Sk. In the following we will occasionally write s = (s¡k;sk;) 2 (S¡k;Sk) in order to
emphasize the impact of individuals with skill level wk on the (true or perceived) state of the
economy.
We also assume that the environment gives rise to a mechanism design problem under com-
plete information; i.e., the state s of the economy is assumed to be known among individuals,
but not to the mechanism designer. The mechanism designer only knows that ¼ 2 ¦c.
Proposition 6 If a social choice function is robustly implementable as a coalition-proof interim
18Nash equilibrium, this implies that it is also robustly implementable under complete information.
The converse implication does not hold.
By Proposition 1, if we only require robust implementability as a Nash equilibrium, then, it does
not make a di®erence whether or not we limit attention to complete information environments.
Proposition 6 shows that, if we add the requirement of coalition-proofness, the equivalence
between robust implementability and robust implementability under complete information is
lost.
The reason is that, with speci¯c beliefs, joint manipulations by individuals who have antag-
onistic preferences may restrict the set of implementable social choice functions. For instance, a
joint manipulation by individuals who are harmed by public good provision and by individuals
who bene¯t from public good provision may work as follows. Those who are harmed by public
good provision are willing to lie so as to make public good provision possible in some state s0
if they are compensated by non-provision in some other state s00. Likewise, individuals who
bene¯t from public good provision are willing to block public good provision in some state if
this implies that the public good will be provided in some other state. However, this is not
possible under conditions of complete information. For instance, if all individuals put a lot of
probability mass on the true state of the economy being s0, then individuals who oppose public
good provision, will not consider the above manipulation attractive. Likewise, if individuals as-
sume that the state is almost surely s00, then individuals who bene¯t from public good provision
will not participate. Consequently, if attention is limited to complete information environments,
then collective incentive compatibility is a less stringent constraint.
4.1 Representative Individuals
In the following, we focus on a speci¯c set of collective incentive compatibility constraints, namely
those which address lies by individuals who have the same skill level.20 We will provide conditions
so that the corresponding collective incentive compatibility constraints can be interpreted as
referring to a representative individual with skill level wk who has to be given incentives so as
to ensure that he reports his own preference truthfully. The collective incentive compatibility
constraints therefore admit an interpretation as individual incentive constraints for an economy
with n agents who have private information about their preferences.
To prevent partial lies by individuals who all have skill level wk, the following collective
incentive compatibility constraints have to be satis¯ed: For any s¡k and any pair sk and s0
k,
there must be l with skl > s0
kl so that
v(q(s¡k;sk);µl) + Vk(s¡k;sk) ¸ v(q(s¡k;s0
k);µl) + Vk(s¡k;s0
k); (18)
where Vk(s) := u(z(s;wk);wk) is a shorthand notation for the utility from private goods that
individuals with skill level wk realize in state s. If this constraint was violated then, in state
s = (s¡k;sk), all individuals with a taste parameter µl so that skl > s0
kl would bene¯t from a
20These conditions are necessary but not su±cient for collective incentive compatibility, because the possibility
of partial lies by individuals of di®erent abilities is left open.
19lie that makes the mechanism designer belief that the distribution of public goods preferences
among individuals with skill level wk equals s0
k.
The following assumption implies that the collective incentive compatibility constraints in
(18) admit the convenient characterization via a representative individual.
Assumption 1 Suppose that, for each skill level wk, the set Sk contains m elements that are
ordered according to ¯rst order stochastic dominance; Sk = fs1
k;:::;sm
k g where, for any l, sl+1
k
¯rst order stochastically dominates sl
k. Moreover, as one moves from sl
k to sl+1
k the mass of all
taste parameters other than µl and µl+1 is una®ected; i.e., the mass of individuals with taste
parameter µl+1 is increased at the expense of individuals with taste parameter µl.
Proposition 7 Under Assumption 1, a social choice function satis¯es the constraints in (18)
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k ) : (20)
Condition (19) is a local upward incentive compatibility constraint for individuals with skill level
wk and taste parameter µl. If sl
k is the true distribution of preferences among those with skill
level wk, then a subset of these individuals could report a taste parameter equal to µl+1 so that
the distribution of preferences that is communicated to the mechanism designer equals sl+1
k . The
incentive constraint (19) ensures that this is not attractive for these individuals. Similarly, (20)
is a local downward incentive compatibility constraint that ensures that these individuals do not
understate their preferences. The Proposition shows that these local incentive constraints are
su±cient to ensure that the constraints in (18) are satis¯ed.21
The incentive conditions in (20) and (19) can be interpreted as referring to a \representative
agent" in the following sense: consider a special version of the above model, so that sk = s1
k
indicates that all individuals with wi = wk have a taste parameter equal to µ1, sk = s2
k indicates
that all individuals with wi = wk have a taste parameter equal to µ2, etc. Hence, in every state
of the economy, all individuals with the same skill level also have the same taste parameter. Now
assume that in order to determine sk the policy maker asks a randomly chosen individual with
skill level wk to make an announcement about the own taste parameter. This again gives rise to
the incentive conditions (20) and (19). These constraints can therefore be interpreted as standard
dominant strategy incentive compatibility constraints in a ¯nite model with n representative
agents, one for each skill level, who make an announcement about their own taste parameter.
21This follows from standard arguments which exploit the assumption that the marginal utility from public
good provision vq increases in the taste parameter, see the Appendix.
20Implications for the analysis of income tax systems
We now use Proposition 7 two derive two implications of collective incentive compatibility for
the joint analysis of tax and expenditure policies. These are necessary conditions, i.e., if they
are violated public policy will be manipulated.
By (19) and (20), collective incentive compatibility holds if and only if for all k, for all s¡k
and for all l < m,
vq(q(sl+1
k ;s¡k);µl+1) ¡ vq(q(sl
k;s¡k);µl+1) ¸ Vk(sl
k;s¡k) ¡ Vk(sl+1




k ;s¡k) ¸ vq(q(sl+1
k ;s¡k);µl) ¡ vq(q(sl
k;s¡k);µl) : (22)
According to (21), the drop in the utility from private goods Vk as one moves from sl
k to sl+1
k
must be bounded from above so that individuals with taste parameter µl+1 are willing to accept
this utility loss in exchange for the utility gain that is due to increased public good provision.
If this condition was violated then individuals with taste parameter µl+1 would understate their
preferences for the public good.
According to (22), the drop in the utility from private goods must be bounded from below.
If this property was violated then the cost of increased public good provision that is born by
individuals with taste parameter µl is so small that these individuals would exaggerate their
public goods preferences.
Adding these inequalities and using the assumption that the marginal utility from public
good provision increases in the taste parameter reveals that q(sl
k;s¡k) · q(sl+1
k ;s¡k), i.e., if
there are ceteris paribus more individuals with a high taste parameter among those with skill
level wk, this increases the amount of the public good that is provided. Using (22) this implies
that Vk(sl
k;s¡k) ¸ Vk(sl+1
k ;s¡k), if more of the public good is provided this must imply that
individuals with skills wk pay more taxes and hence derive a lower utility from private goods.
Moreover, (21) and (22) imply that
q(sl
k;s¡k) = q(sl+1





k ;s¡k) =) Vk(sl
k;s¡k) = Vk(sl+1
k ;s¡k) can be interpreted
as \no taxation without representation", i.e., if a larger willingness to pay for the public good
among individuals with skills wk is not re°ected by the provision rule q, then it is not possible to
tax these individuals more heavily. They would never admit a higher valuation of the public good
if the only consequence was that they have to pay more taxes. The converse implication reads
as \no representation without taxation." If individuals do not pay more taxes as their valuation
of the public good goes up, then the provision rule for the public good cannot incorporate this
change in preferences. Otherwise, individuals would always exaggerate their preferences for the
public good since they do not have to pay for it.
4.2 Groves Mechanisms
In the following we relate the collective incentive compatibility conditions to in (20) and (19)
to the analysis of Groves mechanisms. In ¯nite economy models, these are mechanisms which
21ensure that a truthful revelation of public goods preferences is a dominant strategy equilibrium
and that public goods are provided in a surplus-maximizing way.





l=1 skl v(x;µl) ¡ r(x). The surplus maximizing provision rule is in the following











One well-known problem of Groves mechanism is that budget balance is typically not possible.22
Moreover, surplus-maximizing public goods provision is typically not desirable if there are equity
concerns, as is typically the case in a Mirrleesian model of optimal income taxation. That being
said, the analysis of Groves mechanisms has proven to be very instructive for the analysis of
revelation mechanisms. This lends some interest to Proposition 8 which states necessary and
su±cient conditions so that, in a large economy model in which individuals may jointly hide their
true public goods preferences, a Groves mechanism may simultaneously induces truth-telling and
achieve a surplus maximizing public goods supply.
Proposition 8 A Groves mechanism implements provision rule q¤ subject to the collective in-
centive compatibility constraints (20) and (19) if and only if the following assumptions are met:
Skills are uniformly distributed and, conditional on a certain skill level, there is no heterogeneity
in public goods preferences.
The if-part of this Proposition is not surprising. If all representative agents receive the same
\weight" (fk = 1
n, for all k), and moreover there is no heterogeneity in public goods preferences
among the represented individuals, then we have a model that is equivalent to a ¯nite economy
model with n individuals. For these models, it is well understood that a Groves mechanism
works. The only if-part, however, shows that this structure is not only su±cient but also neces-
sary. If we want to implement the surplus maximizing provision rule, then a Groves mechanism
is, generally, incompatible with the incentive compatibility constraints in (20) and (19).
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has analyzed a large economy in which individuals are privately informed about their
productive abilities and their preferences for public goods. Moreover, there is aggregate uncer-
tainty with respect to the cross-sectional distribution of these characteristics. Using a mechanism
design approach that involves a requirement of robustness with respect to assumptions on in-
dividual beliefs as well as a requirement of coalition-proofness, the analysis has identi¯ed two
sets of incentive conditions for public policy. Individual incentive compatibility constraints take
into account how individuals respond to an income tax system that determines their after-tax
income as a function of their labor supply. Collective incentive compatibility constraints take
22Green and La®ont (1977) show that this is generally true for any mechanism with a dominant strategy
equilibrium that achieves surplus maximization.
22care of the possibility that individuals may lobby for certain tax and expenditure policies and
thus addresses the political reactions that may be triggered by the policy mechanism.
The analysis has led to a set of necessary conditions that are implied by the requirement of
collective incentive compatibility. If a group of individuals experiences a shift in their public
goods preferences such that their willingness to pay for a public good is increased, then it must be
true that more of the public good is provided (otherwise these individuals understate their public
goods preferences) and that these individuals pay more taxes (otherwise they exaggerate their
preferences). More generally speaking, the tax system confronts individuals with prices for public
goods. Collective incentive compatibility requires that these prices are set in an \appropriate"
manner, namely in such a way that the demand for public goods can be determined.
While such arguments are familiar from mechanism design approaches to the free-rider prob-
lem in public goods provision, they have not been introduced into the literature on optimal
taxation. This paper's contribution is to develop a framework that makes it possible to address
problems of preference elicitation and optimal taxation simultaneously.
The argument in this paper is based on a model of optimal income taxation. However,
a similar reasoning applies to any model of taxation. To illustrate this, imagine a model of
capital taxation in the sense of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985b). These are dynamic models
in which a policy maker faces a choice between a tax on labor income and tax on capital
income. Chamley and Judd show that, in a steady state equilibrium, there should be no tax
on capital income. However, the arguments of this paper suggest, that if people with capital
income do not contribute to the ¯nancing of public goods, then it becomes impossible to re°ect
their preferences when choosing the level of public expenditures (\no representation without
taxation"). Alternatively, if their preferences are to be considered, then people with capital
income will have to pay taxes at least in those circumstances where they value the public good
highly. Hence, it seems that a tax on capital income will be needed if it is desirable that people
with capital income have an in°uence on the provision of public goods.
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25A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
By the revelation principle, a social choice function (q;z) is implementable as an interim Nash equilibrium
by some mechanism M for given ¼, if and only if it is truthfully implementable, i.e., if and only if their
exists a direct mechanism M0 with an action set A0 = T and outcome functions Q0 : Á 7! Q0(Á), and




U(Q0(Á);Z0(Á;t0);¯(t)) d¼(Á j t) ; (23)
and (ii) the equilibrium allocation is equal to the social choice function,
Q0(Á) = q(s(Á)) (24)
and, for every t,
Z0(Á;t) = z(s(Á);¯(t)) : (25)
Consequently, we may say that a social choice function is robustly implementable (robustly implementable
under complete information) if and only if there is a direct mechanism satisfying (23), (24) and (25) for
every ¼ (for every ¼ 2 ¦c).
We ¯rst show that (c) ) (a). Given an incentive compatible social choice function (q;z) and given
an arbitrary ¼, construct a direct mechanism (T;Q0;Z0) such that (24) and (25) hold. We seek to verify
that, for every t,
t 2 argmaxt02T
R
¢(T) U(Q0(Á);Z0(Á;t0);¯(t)) d¼(Á j t)
= argmaxt02T
P
s ^ ¼(s j t) U(q(s);z(s;¯(t0));¯(t)) ;
where ^ ¼(s0 j t) := ¼ (fÁ 2 ¢(T) j s(Á) = s0g j t). Equivalently, for every t,
¯(t) 2 argmax(w0;µ0)2W££
P
s ^ ¼(s j t) U(q(s);z(s;w0;µ0);¯(t)) :
This follows from the fact that (q;z) is incentive compatible.
The implication (a) ) (b) is trivial. To complete the proof it remains to be shown that (b) ) (c).
Fix ¼ 2 ¦c and suppose that a direct mechanism (T;Q0;Z0) truthfully implements (q;z). Let s0 be the
corresponding cross-sectional distribution of payo® types. Using conditions (24) and (25) to substitute
for Q0, and Z0, the equilibrium conditions in (23) becomes: for all t and all t0,
U(q(s0);z(s0;¯(t));¯(t)) ¸ U(q(s0);z(s0;¯(t0));¯(t)) ;
or, equivalently, for all (w;µ) and (w0;µ0),
U(q(s);z(s;w;µ);w;µ) ¸ U(q(s);z(s;w0;µ0);w;µ) :
Since the choice of s0 was arbitrary, the latter inequality holds for all s 2 S. Hence, (q;z) is individually
incentive compatible.
26Proof of Proposition 2
The Proposition follows from Lemmas 1 - 5 below.
Lemma 1 Consider a mechanism M = (A;Q;Z) and a strategy ¾¤ that robustly implements a social
choice function (q;z) as a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium. Let A(t;¾¤) be the set of actions that
are chosen by type t with positive probability under ¾¤. Then, for every Á, and every t,
A(t;¾¤) = argmaxa2AU(Q(±(Á;¾¤));Z(±(Á;¾¤);a);¯(t)) : (26)
Proof A necessary condition for robust implementability as a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium,
is robust implementability as an interim Nash equilibrium. In particular, this implies that the strategy
¾¤ prescribes behavior that is a best response for every ¼ that puts unit mass on some ¯xed but arbitrary
Á. If the Lemma is false, then there exists at least one such Á so that the behavior of at least one type
is not a best response to the behavior of all others. Hence, a contradiction.
Given Lemma 1 we may, without loss of generality, limit attention to mechanisms that satisfy condition
(26).
The proof the revelation principle proceeds as follows: We ¯x a social choice function (q;z) and
suppose that there is a mechanism M = (A;Q;Z) and a strategy ¾¤ that satisfy condition (26) as well as
conditions (3) and (4). From the revelation principle for the solution concept of \robust implementability
as an interim Nash equilibrium", we know that there is also a direct mechanism M0 = (T;Q0;Z0) such
that the \honest" strategy h satis¯es all these properties. We then ¯x an arbitrary ¼ and show that ¾¤
is coalition-proof in the game induce by M only if h is coalition-proof in the game induced by M0.
The proof is by contradiction. Hence, suppose to the contrary that, for some given ¼, ¾¤ is coalition-
proof, but h is not. Since M and ¾¤ as well as M0 and h satisfy (3) and (4) we have that, for each
Á,
Q(±(Á;¾¤)) = Q0(Á) = q(s(Á)) ; (27)
and, for each t,
Z(±(Á;¾¤);a(ti)) = Z0(Á;ti) = z(s(Á);¯(ti)) ; (28)
with probability 1.
Also, since h fails to be coalition-proof there exists a subset of types R and a non-truthful equilibrium
strategy (a \lie") l : T ! ¢(T) such that, for all t 2 R, the consistency requirements (13) ¡ (15) are
satis¯ed.
The lie l induces, for each Á 2 ¢(T), an announced cross-sectional distribution of types ^ Á(Á) with




for any subset T0 of T.
With reference to l we now de¯ne a strategy ¾0 for the game induced by mechanism M in the following
way: For every t and every subset A0 of A, let
¾0(A0 j t) =
Z
t02T
¾¤(A0 j t0)dl(t0 j t) : (29)
This construction ensures that the distribution of actions that results if all individuals behave ac-
cording to ¾0 and the distribution of types is given by Á equals the distribution of actions that is induced
27if all individuals behave according to ¾¤ and the distribution of types equals ^ Á(¢ j Á). Formally, for every
Á,
±(Á;¾0) = ±(^ Á(Á);¾¤) : (30)
To see this, note that for every subset A0 of A,
±(A0 j ^ Á(Á);¾¤) =
Z
t02T



















= ±(A0 j Á;¾0) :
Lemma 2 For the given ¼, ¾0 is an interim Nash equilibrium for the game induced by M.
Proof Suppose otherwise. Then there is a type t and an action a 2 A such that
R
¢(T) U(Q(±(Á;¾0));Z(±(Á;¾0);a);¯(t))d¼(Á j t)
>
R
¢(T) U(Q(±(Á;¾0));Z(±(Á;¾0);^ a);¯(t))d¼(Á j t) ;
for all ^ a 2 A(t;¾0). By (30) we may equivalently say that there is a type t and an action a 2 A such that
R
¢(T) U(Q(±(^ Á(Á);¾¤));Z(±(^ Á(Á);¾¤);a);¯(t))d¼(Á j t)
>
R
¢(T) U(Q(±(^ Á(Á);¾¤));Z(±(^ Á(Á);¾¤);^ a);¯(t))d¼(Á j t) ;
(31)
for all ^ a 2 A(t;¾0). By Lemma 1, we may, without loss of generality, assume that the action a that enters
the left hand side of (31) belongs to A(t;¾¤). (Note that if (31) holds for some a, then it must hold, in
particular, for all a 2 A(t;¾¤). ) Also, by construction of ¾0, ^ a 2 A(t;¾0) only if there is a subset T0 of
T with l(T0 j t) > 0 and ^ a 2 A(t0;¾¤) for all types t0 2 T0. Using these observations in conjunction with
equations (27) and (28) implies that there is t0 2 T0 so that
R
¢(T) U(Q0(^ Á(Á));Z0(^ Á(Á);t);¯(t))d¼(Á j t)
>
R
¢(T) U(Q0(^ Á(Á));Z0(^ Á(Á);t0);¯(t))d¼(Á j t) :
This contradicts the assumption that l is an interim Nash equilibrium for mechanism M0.
It remains to be veri¯ed that the equilibrium strategy ¾0 satis¯es the consistency requirements (13)-(15).
Lemma 3 For the given ¼, the equilibrium ¾0 under mechanism M is payo® equivalent to the equilibrium









t02T U(Q0(^ Á(Á));Z0(^ Á(Á);t0);¯(t))dl(t0 j t) d¼(Á j t) :
(32)




A U(Q(±(^ Á(Á);¾¤));Z(±(^ Á(Á);¾¤);a);¯(t))d
¡R









A U(Q(±(^ Á(Á);¾¤));Z(±(^ Á(Á);¾¤);a);¯(t))d¾¤(a j t0) dl(t0 j t)[t0] d¼(Á j t) :
Moreover, equations (27) and (28) imply that
R
A U(Q(±(^ Á(Á);¾¤));Z(±(^ Á(Á);¾¤);a);¯(t))d¾¤(a j t0)
= U(Q0(^ Á(Á));C0(^ Á(Á);t0);Y 0(^ Á(Á);t0);¯(t));
with probability 1. This establishes the Lemma.
Lemma 3, in conjunction with the fact that equilibrium ¾¤ under M is payo® equivalent to equilibrium
h under M0, implies that ¾0 satis¯es the consistency requirement (15).
To establish that also the consistency requirements (13) and (14) are ful¯lled, we assume in the
following that only types in R behave according to ¾0, whereas types in T n R stick to ¾¤.
For each Á this induces an announced cross-sectional distribution of types ¹ Á(Á) with
¹ Á(T0 j Á) =
Z
t2R




for any subset T0 of T.
Also, we have that, for every Á, the distribution of actions that results if individuals with types in
R behave according to ¾0 and all other follow ¾¤ equals the distribution of actions that results if all
individuals follow ¾¤ and the distribution of types equals ¹ Á(Á). Formally, for every Á,
±(¹ Á(Á);¾¤) = ±(Á;(¾¤
TnR;¾0
R)) : (33)
To see that this true, note that for any subset A0 of A,
±(A0 j ¹ Á(Á);¾¤) =
Z
t02T


























¾0(A0 j t) dÁ(t) +
Z
t2TnR
¾¤(A0 j t) dÁ(t)
= ±(A0 j Á;(¾¤
TnR;¾0
R)) :
Lemma 4 For the given ¼ and the given mechanism M, it is a best response for types in R to follow ¾0
if types not in R follow ¾¤.
Lemma 4 implies that the consistency requirement (13) is satis¯ed. A formal proof is omitted, since
it requires only a straightforward adaptation of the proof of Lemma 2. (One just has to replace ¾0 by
(¾¤
TnR;¾0
R) and ^ Á(Á) by ¹ Á(Á), and evaluate the inequalities for some type t 2 R.)
To complete the proof of Proposition 2 we need to show that also consistency requirement (14) is
satis¯ed. This is established by the following Lemma. Again we omit a formal proof, because it follows
the same logic as the proof of Lemma 3.
29Lemma 5 For the given ¼, and any t 2 R, the outcome of strategy pro¯le (¾¤
TnR;¾0
R) under mechanism
M is payo® equivalent to the outcome of strategy pro¯le (hTnR;lR) under M0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a social choice function (q;z) 2 ­(0). Since
S
0·²·¹ ² ­(²) is compact, we can construct a sequence
of social choice functions f(qk;zk)g1




, for each k, which converges to (q;z). By
continuity of the functions v and u this implies that also, for each s, w, and µ, v(qk(s);µ)+u(zk(s;w);w)
converges to v(q(s);µ) + u(z(s;w);w).
To complete the proof we show that (qk;zk) 2 ­(²) for ² > 0 implies that (qk;zk) is not only partially
but also fully coalition-proof. Suppose otherwise, then there must be an alternative equilibrium in which
some individuals lie about their skills. However, by the modi¯ed incentive constraints in (16) revealing
the true taste parameter is a strictly dominant strategy. Hence, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4
Since the social choice is individually incentive-compatible, it satis¯es condition (7). As a consequence,
any partial lie satis¯es the consistency requirements (13). Also, it is an equilibrium if types in R behave
according to a partial lie and types not in R behave truthfully. The consistency requirement (14) therefore
implies that the consistency requirement (15) is satis¯ed. We can therefore conclude that robust partial
coalition-proofness holds if and only the consistency requirement (14) fails for all R, lp and ¼. This is
the statement of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5
The implementability constraints in (10) imply that for any ¿(s) and ®(s), c(s;wk) = wk(1 ¡ ¿(s)) and
y(s;wk) = wk ¡
®(s)
1¡¿(s). Substituting these expressions into the constraints and the objective function,
and dropping constant terms that are irrelevant for the maximization problem, yields the following
optimization problem: Choose ¿(s1), ®(s1), ¿(s2), and ®(s2) in order to maximize
ln(1 ¡ ¿(s1)) + ¸
®(s1)
1 ¡ ¿(s1)
+ ln(1 ¡ ¿(s2)) + ¸
®(s2)
1 ¡ ¿(s2)





for each s, and the collective incentive compatibility constraint,

















1¡¿(s2) this optimization problem can
be rewritten as: Choose ¿(s1) and ¿(s2) in order to maximize
ln(1 ¡ ¿(s1)) + ¸ ¹ w¿(s1) + ln(1 ¡ ¿(s2)) + ¸ ¹ w¿(s2)
subject to the collective incentive compatibility constraint,
k ¡ µ1 ¸ ln(1 ¡ ¿(s1)) ¡ ln(1 ¡ ¿(s2)) +
¹ w
w2
(¿(s2) ¡ ¿(s1)) :
The proof that ¿(s1) is lower and that ¿(s2) is higher, as compared to a model without collective incentive
constraints, involves the following steps: First, use a Lagrangean approach, where ¹ is the non-negative
30multiplier on the collective incentive constraint. Second, derive ¯rst-order conditions and observe that
¿(s1) decreases in ¹ and that ¿(s2) increases in ¹. Hence, if the collective incentive constraint is binding,
¹ is strictly positive and ¿(s1) is therefore larger and ¿(s2) smaller than otherwise. Finally, it follows
from the feasibility constraints that this also implies that ®(s1) is smaller and that ®(s2) is larger than
otherwise if the collective incentive constraint is binding.
Proof of Proposition 6
To prove the Proposition, we provide an example of a partial lie that satis¯es the collective incentive
compatibility constraints, for all ¼ 2 ¦c, but violates it for some ¼ not in ¦c. Suppose that there are two
possible taste parameters £ = fµ1;µ2g and two possible skill levels W = fw1;w2g.
We focus on a subset of states S0 = fs1;s2;s3;s4g, which satisfy the following properties: In states
s1 and s2, all low-skilled individuals have a low valuation of the public good. In states s3 and s4, all
low-skilled individuals have a high valuation of the public good. In states s2 and s3, all high-skilled
individuals have a low valuation of the public good. In states s1 and s4, they all have a high valuation
of the public good.
Denote by xkl(s) the payo® of an individual with taste parameter µl and skill level wk in state
s. Suppose that the social choice function (and hence the truthful equilibrium of a direct mechanism
implementing it) has the following properties: For some ² > 0, x11(s1) = x11(s4)+², x21(s1) = x21(s4)+²,
x12(s1) = x12(s4) ¡ 2², and x22(s1) = x22(s4) ¡ 2². In words, moving from the outcome for state s1 to
the outcome for state s4 harms the low-skilled a little and makes the high-skilled substantially better o®.
Similar e®ects occur with reverse sign as one switches from the outcome for state s3 to the one for state
s4: x12(s3) = x12(s4) + ², x22(s3) = x22(s4) + ², x11(s3) = x11(s4) ¡ 2², and x21(s3) = x21(s4) ¡ 2².
Now consider an incomplete information type space which is such that all types assume that states
s1 and s3 occur with probability 1
2 each, whereas states s2 and s4 occur with probability 0. Consider a
partial lie by all high-skilled and low-skilled individuals which is such that all individuals, irrespective
of their true taste parameter, announce a high taste parameter. The impact of this is as follows: In
states s1 and s3 the outcome stipulated for state s4 is implemented. If the true state turns out to be s1,
low-skilled individuals with a low taste parameter are made worse o® and high-skilled individuals with
a high taste parameter are made better o® by this deviation. This pattern is reversed if the true state
turns out to be s3. From an ex interim perspective, all individuals who are supposed to deviate bene¯t
from this. Hence, collective incentive compatibility fails.
However, this deviation is not attractive under conditions of complete information. Suppose, for
instance, that all individuals belief that s1 is the true state of the economy with probability 1, then
low-skilled individuals with a low taste parameter do no longer bene¯t from this deviation.
Proof of Proposition 7
The constraints in (18) trivially imply that the inequalities (20) and (19) hold. For instance, if (19) was
violated and the true state of the economy was s = (s¡k;sl
k), individuals with taste parameter µl would
collectively lie about their taste parameters and induce an announced distribution (s¡k;s
l+1
k ).
We now want to show that the inequalities (20) and (19) imply that the constraints in (18) are
satis¯ed. First note that for given k, s¡k and l, adding the inequalities (19) and (20), where the latter is
formulated for l + 1 instead of l, yields
v(q(s
l+1
k ;s¡k);µl+1) ¡ v(q(sl
k;s¡k);µl+1) ¸ v(q(s
l+1
k ;s¡k);µl) ¡ v(q(sl
k;s¡k);µl)
Using the assumption that vq(q;µ) is, for every given q, increasing in µ makes it possible to show that
q(s¡k;s
l+1
k ) ¸ q(s¡k;sl
k) : (34)
31Second, suppose that the true state of the economy is (s¡k;sl
k). Then any manipulation of individuals
with wi = wk requires the participation of those with µi = µl. If those individuals do not participate
and reveal their characteristics truthfully, any alternative manipulation would induce a result that is
incompatible with Sk, i.e., that occurs with probability zero. We may hence assume, without loss of
generality, that the mechanism deters such manipulations.
Third, the inequalities (20) and (19) exclude that individuals with µi = µl participate in a \local devia-
tion", i.e., a manipulation that induces the outcome for state (s¡k;s
l+1
k ) or state (s¡k;s
l¡1
k ) if the true
state is (s¡k;sl
k) . It remains to be shown that these individuals do also refuse participation for any other
manipulation.
Consider a manipulation that attempts to induce the outcome for state (s
l+j
k ;s¡k) for some j > 1. We





k ;s¡k);µl) + Vk(s
l+j
k ;s¡k) : (35)
The monotonicity of q, (see the inequality in (34)) and the assumption that vq(q;µ) is increasing in µ,
have the following implication: The local incentive constraint
v(q(s
l+j¡1
k ;s¡k);µl+j¡1) + Vk(s
l+j¡1
k ;s¡k) ¸ v(q(s
l+j
k ;s¡k);µl+j¡i) + Vk(s
l+j
k ;s¡k) :
implies that for all g · l + j ¡ 1,
v(q(s
l+j¡1
k ;s¡k);µg) + Vk(s
l+j¡1
k ;s¡k) ¸ v(q(s
l+j
k ;s¡k);µg) + Vk(s
l+j
k ;s¡k) :



















k ;s¡k);µl) + Vk(s
l¡j
k ;s¡k) ;
for all j > 1.
Proof of Proposition 8
The construction of a Groves mechanism is based on two observations. First, a surplus-maximizing choice

































32A Groves mechanism is based on the idea to choose Vk such that two maximization problems are equiva-
lent. This requires that (i) for every k, for all s¡k, for all sl
k, and for all s
j
k the objective functions of the























and (ii) that the right-hand side of (38) is indeed independent of sl
k, the true distribution of preferences
among individuals with skill level wk. Generally, it is not be possible to achieve (i) and (ii) simultaneously.
However, if we impose the assumptions that skills are uniformly distributed (fk = 1
n, for each k) and that
there is no heterogeneity in public goods preferences among individuals with the same taste parameter
(for each k, s1
k = (fk;0;:::;0), s2
k = (0;fk;0;:::;0), :::, sm
k = (0;:::;0;fk)) a Groves mechanism works.




























which is just the standard de¯nition of a Groves mechanism.
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